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OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Douglas Thomas petitions for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration
Appeals sustaining the Department of Homeland Security’s appeal of an order of the
Immigration Judge. The IJ had granted Thomas relief under the Convention Against
Torture (“CAT”) and thereby precluded his removal to Haiti.   For the reasons that
follow, we will deny the petition for review.
I.  
Inasmuch as we are writing primarily for the parties who are familiar with this
case, we need not reiterate the factual or procedural background of this appeal except
insofar as may be helpful to our discussion. 
In proceedings before an IJ, Thomas conceded deportability but applied for relief
under the CAT,  waiver of removal under former § 212(c) of the INA,  and for removal
of his conditional permanent resident status through an I-751 waiver.  
At a merits hearing before the IJ, Thomas testified in support of his application for
protection under the CAT.  He contended that because he is a criminal deportee he will
be indefinitely detained in a Haitian prison upon his return and that he will be forced to
endure appalling prison conditions that amount to torture.  He further contended that he
For example, the Country Report states:1
Police mistreatment of suspects at both the time of arrest and during
detention remains pervasive in all parts of the country.  Beating with fists,
sticks, and belts is by far the most common form of abuse.  However,
international organizations documented other forms of mistreatment, such
as burning with cigarettes, choking, hooding, and kalot marassa (severe
boxing of the ears, which can result in eardrum damage).  Those who
reported such abuse often had visible injuries consistent with the alleged
maltreatment.  There were also isolated allegations of torture by electric
shock.  Mistreatment also takes the form of withholding of medical
treatment from injured jail inmates.  Police almost never are prosecuted for
the abuse of detainees.
App. 71-72.  
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would be injured or killed because he assisted the prosecution of three Haitian drug
dealers – Teddy Delinois, Reginald LaRouche and Jeremy Kernase.  
He submitted documentary evidence, most notably the U.S. State Department’s
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000, to support his claim for CAT relief
based upon the conditions in Haitian prisons. That report corroborates his claim that
criminals who are deported to Haiti are detained in Haitian prisons and that the prison
conditions are beyond deplorable.1
Thomas also contended that Haitian officials connected with Delinois and
LaRouche would injure or kill him if he is returned.  He offered only his own testimony
in support of that claim.
The IJ granted Thomas’s application for adjustment of status to lawful permanent
resident.  However, the IJ denied Thomas’s application for an INA § 212(c) waiver.  The
The BIA’s review of this claim was based on a de novo review of the factual2
(continued...)
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IJ also concluded that since Thomas had been convicted of a particularly serious crime,
he was ineligible for withholding of removal.  However, the IJ did grant Thomas’s
application for deferral of removal pursuant to the CAT.  
The IJ explained:
he’ll be placed in a situation where I believe he will be tortured.  The
intentional infliction of mental and physical suffering.  The correction
system, the government, the people behind the government, the people
connected with the drug people all have the ability to harm him once he’s
in prison.  There are myriad of different ways that they can harm him, and I
believe that torture is one of them and I believe that it is more likely than
not that he will be tortured upon return to Haiti, once he’s taken into
custody and I don’t think there’s any question he’ll be taken into custody
because of his open and notorious testimony in the Federal courts against
the Haitian drug dealers.
Ap. 19-20.  
II
Both Thomas and the government appealed to the BIA.  The BIA sustained the
government’s appeal, vacated the IJ’s order and ordered Thomas removed from the
United States to Haiti.   It held that Thomas’s detention upon return to Haiti does not,
without more,  establish that it is more likely than not that he will be subjected to
“torture” within the meaning of the CAT.  It based that holding on its precedential
opinion in Matter of J-E, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (BIA 2002). 
In addressing Thomas’s claim of retribution from Haitian drug dealers,  the BIA2
(...continued)2
record.  Under currently applicable regulations, the BIA’s review of the IJ’s factual
findings is under a “clearly erroneous” standard.  8 C.F.R.  § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).  However,
the current regulations do not apply to this case because Thomas’s appeal to the BIA was
filed before the current regulations calling for the clearly erroneous standard were
implemented in September 2002.  Wang v. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 347, 349 (3d Cir. 2004).  
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noted:
[Thomas] contended that people linked to Teddy Delinois will harm him. 
He asserted that Mr. Delinois has an aunt, Beret Delinois, who was married
to a former drug lord, Jean-Claude Paul, who had a right-hand man, Danny
Toussant, who is now a senator, who has a security force that would harm
him upon his return.  Accordingly, the . . . contention that someone three
steps removed from Mr. Delinios will seek him out and torture him is
speculative.  It is also unlikely in light of [Thomas’s] admission that Beret
Delinois and Jean-Claude Paul died in 1988 and 1990, respectively, over a
decade ago, which was prior to [Thomas’s] cooperation with the
authorities.
App. 3A.   The BIA also noted the lack of corroborating evidence to support his claims. 
Thomas testified that his cousin in Haiti had told him that Toussant was aware of his
pending removal.  He testified that his cousin knew this because his cousin’s uncle is part
of the Haitian National Police Force.  The BIA was skeptical because Thomas failed to
submit an affidavit or letter from his cousin or his cousin’s uncle.  The BIA explained:
“considering the alleged harm as a result of [Thomas’s] deportation to Haiti, the absence
of such proof from a family member undermines the credulity of the assertions.”  App.
3B.  The BIA also noted that Thomas adduced no proof that his cousin’s uncle is even a
member of the police force in Haiti.
Similarly, the BIA explained the following with regard to Thomas’s professed fear
  Although we agree with that Thomas has not established the likelihood of3
torture under our precedent, we nevertheless hasten to add a note of caution insofar as the
BIA seems to have expected documentary evidence of threats against Thomas by Haitian
drug dealers.   It is highly unlikely that drug dealers, or those associated with them,
would generate documentary evidence of  illegal activity or threats of revenge against
someone who has cooperated with the government. The BIA did not elaborate upon the
kind of documentary evidence Thomas might reasonably be expected to have of any such
threats, and we cannot imagine any such documents.  Nevertheless, as we shall explain,
our concern with this facet of the BIA’s ruling does not undermine the conclusion that
Thomas has not shown eligibility for relief under the CAT.
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of retribution from Reginald LaRouche: 
[Thomas] also contended that relatives of Reginald LaRouche will harm
him if he is deported to Haiti.  This conclusion is similarly based on the
testimony of [Thomas]. [He] contended that Mr. LaRouche’s father “is a
millionaire and owns a hotel” and is “well-connected politically.” 
However, when asked how Mr. LaRouche’s father would know that he is
fighting deportation, [Thomas] explained that a “middleman” may have
told Mr. LaRouche and that a friend relayed this information to him.  Yet,
this “friend” was not present at [Thomas’s] hearing, despite the fact that he
is a United States Citizen.
App. 3B.  
Given Thomas’s failure to support his assertion that he will be targeted by Haitian
drug dealers upon his return to Haiti, the BIA concluded that he had not met his burden
under the CAT.   It conceded that an applicant’s testimony, standing alone, can suffice
where it is believable, consistent, and is sufficiently detailed to provide a plausible and
coherent account of the basis of the fear. However, the BIA concluded that Thomas’s
testimony did not satisfy that test because it was not sufficiently documented, detailed or
credible. Id.3
7IV. 
Thomas filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2241 in which he challenged the BIA’s removal order.  The petition was
pending on May 11, 2005, when the REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.L No. 109-13, Div. B,
119 Stat. 231, was enacted.  Section 106(a) of the REAL ID Act amended 8 U.S.C. §
1252(a)(2) of the INA by eliminating the district court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction over
final orders of removal in nearly all cases.  Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645, 647 (3d
Cir. 2006).   “Consequently, a petition for review filed in the appropriate court of appeals
‘is [now] the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of any cause or claim under
the [CAT].”  Id. (quoting REAL ID Act § 106(a)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(4)).  A
related provision, § 106(c) of the REAL ID Act, “provided that habeas petitions filed
under § 2241 which were pending in the district court before May 11, 2005, shall be
transferred to the court of appeals ‘for the circuit in which a petition for review could
have been properly filed . . . [and treated] as if it had been filed pursuant to a petition for
review,’ with an exception not relevant here.”  Francois, at 647 (citing REAL ID Act §
106(c)).   Consequently, Thomas’s habeas petition was transferred to this court and was
converted into a petition for review. 
VI.
Although 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) nominally operates to strip courts of appeals
of jurisdiction to adjudicate petitions for review of removal orders filed by aggravated
Article 3 of the CAT states: “No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or4
extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that
he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.”  Art. 3(1), S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-
20, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85.
 The Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) was then an agency under5
the Department of Justice. 
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felons, the REAL ID Act restores our jurisdiction to review “constitutional claims and
questions of law” by amending 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).  Thus, our review is limited to
“pure questions of law” and “issues of application of law to fact, where the facts are
undisputed and not the subject of challenge.”   Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of the United States,
420 F.3d 202, 210-11 (3d Cir. 2005).  We  review the BIA’s legal conclusions de novo,
but afford deference to the BIA’s reasonable interpretations of statutes which it is
charged with administering.  Id.  However, we do not have jurisdiction to review the
discretionary or factual determinations of the BIA.  Id.
VI. THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE
On October 21, 1998, the President signed the Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998 (“FARRA”), Pub.L. No. 105-277, Div. G., 112 Stat. 2681-
761, into law.  That Act implemented Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture  and4
required that implementing regulations be promulgated by the interested agencies within
120 days.  As directed, the Department of Justice promulgated regulations setting forth
the procedures by which aliens could obtain CAT relief.  See 64 Fed. Reg. 8478, codified
at 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.16(c), 208.17 & 208.18(a).   5
98 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1), the regulatory definition of torture, mirrors the definition
of torture contained in Article 1 of the CAT.  Certain subsections of § 208.18 are
relevant here:
(a)(1) Torture is defined as any act by which severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or her or a third person information or a
confession, punishing him or her for an act he or she or a third person has
committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing
him or her or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of
any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.
(a)(2) Torture is an extreme form of cruel and inhuman treatment and does
not include lesser forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment that does not amount to torture.
(a)(3) Torture does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
it or incidental to lawful sanctions.
(a)(4) In order to constitute torture, mental pain or suffering must be
prolonged mental harm caused by or resulting from:
(i) The intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(ii) The administration or application,  or threatened
administration or application, of mind altering substances or
other procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the senses
or the personality;
(iii) The threat of imminent death; or
(iv) The threat that another person will imminently be
subjected to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the
administration of mind altering substances or other
procedures calculated to disrupt profoundly the sense or
Applicants for CAT relief can seek either deferral of removal or withholding of6
removal.  Regulations for withholding of removal are found at 8 C.F.R. § 208.16 and the
regulations for deferral are found at § 208.17.  “However, the general standards of
eligibility for each are identical, i.e., a requirement that an alien establish that future
‘torture’ is ‘more likely than not.’” Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 134 n. 8 (3d Cir.
2005).  
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personality.
(a)(5) In order to constitute torture, an act must be specifically intended to
inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering.  An act that results in
unanticipated or unintended severity of pain and suffering is not torture.
The Department of Justice also promulgated regulations specifying the elements of
a CAT claim, and the burden of proof.  Section 208.16(c)(2) provides that “[t]he burden
of proof is on the applicant for withholding of removal  to establish that it is more likely6
than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal.” 
If an applicant establishes that he  “more likely than not would be tortured” upon removal
to his home country, withholding or deferral of removal is mandatory.  8 C.F.R. §§
208.16(c)(3) and (4).  The objective evidence to be considered in evaluating a CAT claim
includes “[e]vidence of past torture inflicted upon the applicant;” “[e]vidence of gross,
flagrant or mass violations of human rights within the country of removal;” and “[o]ther
relevant information regarding conditions in the country of removal.”  See 8 C.F.R. §
208.16(c)(3); see also 8 C.F.R. § 208.17(a).  
VII.  DISCUSSION
Thomas makes two arguments in support of his petition for review.  Each is
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discussed below.
A.  The BIA Applied an Impermissible “Specific Intent”
Requirement to the CAT Claim.
Before the BIA, Thomas contended that he was entitled to CAT relief because, as a
criminal deportee, he will be detained in a Haitian prison where he will be subjected to
horrendous conditions tantamount to torture.  However, the BIA quickly rejected that
argument stating: “the fact that [Thomas] may be subject to imprisonment in Haiti does
not without more establish that it is more likely than not he would be tortured.  See Matter
of J-E, 23 I&N Dec. 291 (BIA 2002).”  App. 2A.   
In Matter of J-E, the BIA held that the use of the terms “intentionally inflicted” and
“specifically intended” in the regulatory definitions of torture constitute a “specific intent”
requirement.  In his petition for review, Thomas argues that the BIA’s reliance on Matter
of J-E in denying his claim for CAT relief was error because the BIA applied an
impermissible “specific intent” standard to his CAT claim.  In Thomas’s view, our
decision in Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 2003), overruled Matter of J-E.
We disagree.  In Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123 (3d Cir. 2005), decided after
Zubeda, we rejected the very argument Thomas is making here, and held that the brutal
and horrendous conditions that prison inmates and detainees face in Haiti do not amount
to torture.    We again rejected this argument in Francois v. Gonzales, 448 F.3d 645 (3d
Cir. 2006).  We distinguished our analysis there from our analysis in Zubeda as follows:
“[o]ur entire discussion [in Zubeda] was in the context of a woman who alleged that she
 Pursuant to the REAL ID Act’s amendments to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), we7
have jurisdiction to consider a petition for review of an alien convicted of a drug
trafficking crime, but our jurisdiction is limited to that of constitutional claims and
questions of law.  Kamara v. Attorney Att’y, 420 F.3d 202, 211 (3d Cir. 2005).   
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would be raped if returned to her native country, and we had to determine if that
allegation could support relief under the CAT . . .”.  The situation here is quite different. 
 Accordingly, Auguste and Francois control Thomas’s prison conditions claim.
In fact, the only thing distinguishing Thomas’s situation from that in Auguste and
Francois is Thomas’s claim that because of his cooperation with the government in the
prosecution of Haitian drug dealers, relatives of those drug dealers would harm or kill him
with the consent of or acquiescence of Haitian government if he was returned to Haiti.  As
noted, that claim was rejected by the BIA.  The BIA concluded that that claim was not
supported by the record, and we cannot review the BIA’s factual determinations.   7
Undeterred, Thomas argues that even if the specific intent standard discussed in
Zubeda is the appropriate one, the BIA applied an unlawful “heightened” specific intent
standard.  Thomas notes that his application for CAT relief was premised upon two
grounds. The first was prison conditions; the second was his contention that he would be
subjected to torture because of he assisted in prosecuting Haitian drug dealers.  Although
the IJ agreed with his second ground, the BIA rejected it.  It wrote:
In our review, we find that the record does not support [Thomas’s]
assertions at his hearing that relatives of the individuals he helped prosecute,
or people connected with these relatives, are waiting for him in Haiti and
plan to torture him.
13
App. 3A (emphasis added).  In Thomas’s view, the italicized words demonstrate that the
BIA applied an impermissible heightened specific intent standard to his claim.  Thus, he
submits that had the BIA applied the Auguste “specific intent” standard, it would have
been compelled to find that he proved that associates of the drug dealers possessed the
necessary intent. We disagree. 
The statement in question cannot be read out of context, and it is clear from the
totality of the BIA’s discussion that it understood that the intent required under the
applicable regulation.
B.  Remand for Additional Factfinding.
Thomas asks that we remand to the BIA if we decide that the current record does
not establish eligibility for CAT relief.  He contends that in the four and one-half year 
time period between his hearing before the IJ and our  receipt of the administrative record,
dramatic changes have occurred in Haiti, most notably the ouster of President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide on February 24, 2004.  He claims these changes have worsened human
rights conditions in general and conditions for detained deportees in particular.
However, we do not believe that we have jurisdiction to remand for additional
factfinding.  Under normal administrative review:
If a party to a proceeding to review applies to the court of appeals in
which the proceeding is pending for leave to adduce additional
evidence and shows to the satisfaction of the court that--
(1) the additional evidence is material; and
(2) there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence
before the agency; the court may order the additional evidence and
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any counterevidence the opposite party desires to offer to be taken by
the agency. The agency may modify its findings of fact, or make new
findings, by reason of the additional evidence so taken, and may
modify or set aside its order, and shall file in the court the additional
evidence, the modified findings or new findings, and the modified
order or the order setting aside the original order. 
28 U.S.C. § 2347©) (emphasis added).  In immigration cases, the jurisdictional statute
allows us to review decisions of the BIA as final agency determinations in the usual manner
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341 et seq., except that it specifically bars us from remanding to the
agency for further factfinding.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) (“[T]he court may not order the
taking of additional evidence under 28 U.S.C. § 2347©)”) (emphasis added).  In addition,
the jurisdictional statute stipulates that “the court of appeals shall decide the petition only
on the administrative record on which the order of removal is based.”  8 U.S.C. §
1252(b)(a)(4)(A) (emphasis added).  When read together, these two provisions reflect a
congressional intent to extend our jurisdiction only to review of the final order of removal.
It does not further extend to order additional factfinding.  
In Berishaj v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 314, 330 (3d Cir. 2004), we stated that “Congress
could require the Courts of Appeals, in their sound discretion, on motion or sua sponte, to
grant petitions for review of the BIA, and remand when it appears from judicially
noticeable materials that the record compiled before the agency does not generally reflect
contemporary country conditions.”  However, we also held that we are unable to afford any
such relief under current law and that the appropriate procedure is moving to reopen
proceedings on the basis of new facts.  We also encouraged the BIA and the Government to
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take responsibility for updating records when necessary.  Id. at 330-31.  We reiterated the
Berishaj holding in Kamara v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 420 F.3d 202, 218 (3d Cir. 2005),
again holding that we are unable to look beyond the administrative record.  We again
requested that the Attorney General screen cases that are inappropriate for appellate review
because of changed circumstances, but this was, as in Berishaj, no more than a request,
reflecting our holding that we could not force the parties to update the record through
remand.  Id.
Although we do not think that we have jurisdiction to remand for additional
factfinding, we do believe that Thomas can move to reopen.  The typical time and numeric
limitations on motions to reopen do not apply when the purpose of the motion is “[t]o apply
or reapply for asylum or withholding of deportation based on changed circumstances
arising in the country of nationality or in the country to which deportation has been
ordered, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been
discovered or presented at the previous hearing.”  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii).  It is true
that Thomas ultimately seeks deferral of removal rather than withholding, but regulations
actually classify deferral of removal not as a separate claim for relief but as relief that is
given as a matter of right if the alien would be eligible for withholding of removal but for
his criminal conviction.  The regulation reads:
An alien who: has been ordered removed; has been found
under  § 208.16(c)(3) [the withholding of removal regulation]
to be entitled to protection under the Convention Against
Torture; and is subject to the provisions for mandatory denial
16
of withholding of removal under  § 208.16(d)(2) or (d)(3), shall
be granted deferral of removal to the country where he or she is
more likely that not to be tortured.
8 C.F.R. § 2087.17(a) (emphasis added).  Thus, Thomas should be able to move to reopen
for the purposes of applying for deferral of removal based on changed circumstances.  
VIII.  CONCLUSION
For all of the above reasons, we will deny the petition for review.
